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Waged by Lancastrian and Yorldst dynasties in the second half  of  the fifteenth  cen-
tury, the English civil wars blown as the Wars of  the Roses counterposed two royal 
lines of  succession. Through a statute enacted decades before  the outbreak of  civil 
strife,  Henry IV, the first  Lancastrian king, sought to guarantee the English throne 
for  his heirs. This 1406 statute "ordained and established, That the inheritance of  the 
Crown, and of  the Realms of  England and France, and of  all other Dominions of  our 
Lord the King beyond the Sea, with all the Appurtenances, shall be settled and 
remain in the Person of  the same our Lord the King, and in the Heirs of  his Body 
begotten...."1 The statute was eventually challenged during the reign of  Henry VI, 
the grandson of  Henry IV 
Declared and attainted a traitor to the king in 1459, Richard, Duke of  York, 
asserted that his right to the throne preceded that of  Henry VI. York traced his lin-
eage, as did the Lancastrian Henry VI, back to Edward III but through Edward's 
third son, Lionel. John of  Gaunt, Duke of  Lancaster, was the fourth  son. York rea-
soned that a statute which entailed the Crown attested to the illegitimacy of  the very 
line of  descent that it sought to secure. Additionally, he argued that there was a 
higher law that claimed one's obedience over any statute, observing that the 1406 
statute was "of  no force  or effect  ayenst him that is right enheriter of  the said Coro-
nes, as it accordeth with Godd's lawe, and all natural lawes..."2 As E.F. Jacob has 
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noted, the eventual success of  York's claim, although the higher law was backed up 
by force,  revealed that "God's law of  inheritance [was] valid, and not to be defeated 
by parliament."3 Indeed, York's subordination of  statute law to God and natural law 
reflects  a traditional medieval outlook.4 
The Yorkists forced  Henry VI from  England in 1461. Richard was killed in bat-
tle; his eldest son, Edward, became the first  Yorkist king. Henry and various Lancas-
trian supporters took up residence in Scotland. Among those accompanying the 
deposed king was Sir John Fortescue (^1385-1479), Chief  Justice of  the King's 
Bench. Early during this exile Fortescue completed De Natura  Legis Naturae,  et de 
Eius Censura in Sueeessione Regnorum Supreme  (c  1462, or The  Nature  of  the Law of 
Nature,  and  Its  Judgment  on the Succession of  Sovereign  Kingdoms),  a treatise that with-
out referring  directly to the Yorkist-Lancastrian debate nevertheless sets out the crite-
ria for  distinguishing a true line of  royal succession, and thus a natural one, from  a 
false,  unnatural one.5 
Locating the problem of  royal descent in the Kingdom of  Assyria, Fortescue 
divides De Natura  into two parts. Part I explains why natural law should be used to 
solve the succession question, and Part II devises a courtroom setting in which three 
claimants to the throne present their respective cases to a judge. Both Parts I and II 
are designed to solve this dispute. As Fortescue formulates  it: 
A King, acknowledging no superior in things temporal, has a daughter and 
a brother; the daughter bears a son. The King dies without sons. The ques-
tion is, whether the kingdom of  the King so deceased descends to the 
Daughter, the Daughter's Son, or the Brother of  the King.6 
Fortescue's Assyrian allegory introduces a woman into the equation for  an important 
reason. For although the Yorkist line traced its lineage back to the third son of 
Edward III, the inheritance of  that son, Lionel, descended to a daughter, Philippa, 
his only heir. Thus, it is Fortescue's project to have the Judge determine that natural 
law excludes women and their heirs from  inheriting public property. De Natura, 
therefore,  enters deliberately into the politics of  royal and non-roval identity through 
the lens of  gender and sexual difference. 
Following medieval tradition, Fortescue derives the origin of  property from  the 
Fall of  Adam and Eve. Yet Fortescue's particular emphasis on God's declaration to 
Adam that he will henceforth  earn his bread through the sweat of  his brow exceeds 
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that tradition.7 For Fortescue this particular penalty holds within it the right of  men 
and not women to acquire, transfer,  and inherit property. While he explicitly appeals 
to the inalterability of  natural gender differences  to justify  a masculine descent of 
property, his theory of  the natural law of  royal succession depends as well on an 
implicit instability in the relation between gender and perceived sexual difference.  I 
argue that the elasticity of  masculine and feminine  identities in De Natura  allows 
Fortescue to establish royal dignity as a unique property that defines  a king as the 
most masculine of  men who has the authority to confiscate  and reallocate both the 
land and the gender of  his subjects. In so doing, Fortescue simulateneously inscribes 
his own authority or property to interpret divine, natural, and secular law in such a 
way as to benefit  kings and, most importantly, himself. 
The Descent of Property 
Arguing in Part II of  the treatise that he is the rightful  heir to the throne of  Assyria, 
the Brother of  the King submits that both natural and divine law preclude a woman 
and her heirs from  inheriting public property. Thus, while the Daughter of  the King 
"be the natural and domestic medium between the grandfather  and the grandson, by 
which the blood  and private inheritance of  the grandfather  may be transferred  to the 
grandson, yet in respect of  the kingdom, which is public property, and which the 
daughter cannot receive from  the grandfather,  she is a strange and foreign  medium" 
(297, emphasis added). To support this thesis, the Brother relates the history of 
property and describes the law that governs its descent. 
As he remarks, Scripture indicates that "before  the fall  of  man, the law of  nature 
in no way revealed" the right of  inheritance "to men" (291). That is, before  the Fall, 
"our first  parents...possessed all things in common" (291). Indeed, earlier in the text, 
Fortescue has explained that "the very law which now makes us say, 'this is mine and 
that thine,' before  the sin of  man forbad"  us to do so (211). The origin of  property 
occurs, therefore,  as a consequence of  the first  sin. The Brother, in fact,  specifically 
identifies  one particular punishment of  the Fall as the origin of  the property: When 
our "first  parents...forsook  their state of  innocence, presently, the Lord said to the 
human race, 'In the sweat of  thy brow thou shalt eat bread;' in which words was 
granted to man a property in things which he should acquire by his labour" (291). 
Although the biblical narrative of  the Fall does indeed have God tell Adam that he 
will toil for  his bread, it says nothing of  the acquisition of  property. In point of  fact, 
Genesis accentuates punishment, situating the penalty of  work between God's curse 
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on the earth and the promise that Adam will toil until the day he returns "unto the 
ground...for  dust thou art" (Genesis 3:19). The biblical narrative thus emphasises 
adverse changes in Adam's relation to God and to the earth. Moreover, the punish-
ments meted out to both Adam and Eve are followed  by their joint expulsion from 
the Garden of  Eden. Our first  parents, therefore,  are dispossessed of  what they once 
enjoyed. 
Yet while the biblical account bespeaks loss, the penalty for  sin in the Brother's 
narrative leads not to dispossession but to the acquisition of  property. The bridge 
between the Genesis narrative and the Brother's argument hinges on his reading of 
"sweat" as the catalyst that through a series of  steps transforms  loss into gain. "For 
since," he reasons, "the bread which a man gained by his labour was his own, and no 
man could eat bread without the sweat of  his own brow, every man who toiled not 
was prohibited from  eating bread which by his own sweat another man had 
acquired." Here Fortescue echoes John of  Paris who, in the Tractatus  de  Potcstate 
Regia et Papali, observed that possessions are "acquired by individuals through their 
own manufacture,  industry, and labour. And individuals as individuals have right, 
power, and true dominion."8 What was once common to all is now earned individu-
all}' by those who work. 
Moreover, the sweat that a man expends translates into bread, and by bread "our 
ancestors taught us to understand...not only what is eaten and drunk, but everything 
whereby man is sustained" (291). Sweat also performs  another important function: 
"because property so acquired ensures as a compensation for  the sweat by which the 
body of  the acquirer is enfeebled,  the reason of  the law of  nature hath united it to its 
acquirer, so that the property gained might compensate the damage resulting from 
his loss of  bodily weakness" (291). Indeed, the penalty God imposes on Adam takes 
on a positive aspect, a means to overcome the dispossession described in Genesis. In 
the Brother's narrative, the loss of  sweat substitutes for  the loss of  Eden. 
The sweat a man expends results in two types of  properties: external property, 
such as land, and internal property, such as an innate right or attribute. It is this 
two-fold  aspect of  sweat and property that, according to Fortescue, founds  the law of 
the descent of  property. For the property that is gained through labour: 
takes die place of  the man's bodily integrity, which he has lost and coheres 
as an accident to the toiler...so thenceforth  [it] accompanies his blood. 
And...property accrues to him by the rules of  the law of  nature, and, after 
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the likeness of  a natural accident, is united to him....Wherefore  such a pro-
prietor hath a son descending from  him, a certain right to the patrimony so 
acquired also descends in the father's  lifetime  in a latent manner to that son, 
as being a portion of  his father's  blood and so a sharer in his toil. And, as 
the flower  bursting forth  before  the fruit  is not the fruit,  but a token of 
coming fruit,  so that right which descends to the son in his father's  lifetime 
is not a property in his father's  patrimony, but an indication of  a property 
which will descend, whereby on the father's  death all his patrimony, follow-
ing that right as the fruit  doth flower,  actually descends and imparts itself  to 
the son....Thus then we have discovered the source of  the law of  descent 
and succession; and from  this we have drawn how property capable of 
descent originally took its spring; how, also, that property annexed itself  to 
man; and lastly, how, descending from  man to man by right of  succession, it 
infuses  itself  into each succeeding heir (291-292). 
By the transmutation of  sweat, property is both inside and outside the body; thus, it 
becomes possible to transmit both forms  through the blood. The sin of  Adam and its 
transmission to the human race recede into the background in this narrative that 
accounts for  the origin, acquisition, and transfer  of  property. 
There is, however, a story of  dispossession contained within the Brother's 
account of  the origin of  property. At this particular point in his narrative, it is not 
clear if  Eve participates with Adam in the acquisition of  property. Indeed, he has 
already observed that God "called Adam and Eve by the one name of 
Adam9...[w]herefore  no woman, as also no man, eats her bread without sweat" 
(281). It would seem, therefore,  that women as well as men acquire and internalise 
the property earned through work. Yet as the Brother's argument unfolds,  he focuses 
on an opposition between property that is movable and personal and property that is 
immovable and real. This division works to exclude women from  the descent of 
property and royal succession. As he explains, the property Adam acquires through 
his labour, 
does not apply to every kind of  property, but only to property in immove-
able and praedial things, which things are lasting as man's nature is. But 
things moveable and personal, which are not permanent, though gained by 
labour, do not always pass to heirs, but often  to executors, trustees, lega-
tees, and ordinaries, and sometimes to wives and children, to be divided 
among them, distributed according to various local customs, in various 
ways (292). 
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As the Brother will later remark, movable property is distinct from  immovable in 
that it can be "seized and disposed of1  (314). 
Up to this point in the treatise, the Brother, along with the Grandson, has 
argued that natural law prohibits a woman from  inheriting public property while it 
permits her to inherit private property. We recall that she is, according to the Brother, 
"the natural and domestic medium between the grandfather  and the grandson, by 
which the blood  and private inheritance of  the grandfather  may be transferred  to the 
grandson, yet in respect of  the kingdom, which is public property, and which the 
daughter cannot receive from  the grandfather,  she is a strange and foreign  medium" 
(297, emphasis added). The critical distinction is between private and public. And 
since Fortescue has stated that before  the Fall all was held in common, his account of 
the origin and acquisition of  property is in effect  a narrative of  the origin of  private 
property. Thus, women would not be excluded. Yet in this part of  his argument, the 
Brother does not use the terms public and private. Rather thev are tacitly displaced by 
"immoveable and praedial" and "moveable and personal." The substitution amounts 
to a rhetorical sleight of  hand, lending the aspects of  movability and the personal to 
private property, since a woman can inherit it, and the aspects of  permanency and 
immovability to public property, since only a man can inherit it. 
The substitution also implicitly constructs and endorses a stereotypical differ-
ence between masculine and feminine  identities. Although a woman must earn her 
bread, the type of  property she acquires is "not lasting as man's nature is" and thus is 
not capable of  descent. The movable property she acquires is always subject to con-
fiscation;  in turn, inconstancy, instability, and the personal constitute feminine  iden-
tity—a description that works well with Fortescue's exposition of  Eve's disobedience 
to God and Adam. For although the penalty of  earning one's bread is, as the Brother 
remarks, "indifferent  and common to both sexes, the woman sustains other great and 
grievous penalties," and because of  these additional, different  penalties, the "Divine 
judgment evidently shows that she sinned worse than man" (282). Eve's sin is worse 
because out of  a desire to fulfill  her own pleasure she presumed to instruct her supe-
rior. As the Brother reasons, 
it would not have become so great a Judge to deprive of  the honour of 
dominion, on account of  his folly,  the man who, by the woman's insult fell; 
but inasmuch as the inferior  deserted her original obedience, it was agree-
able to reason to increase the weight of  the superior's power over the con-
tumacious one more severely than before,  even if  that superior had been 
guilty of  the greater crime (282). 
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It becomcs clear, then, that the notion that Adam and Eve possessed all things in 
common before  the Fall was not precisely correct. Adam was the superior from  the 
beginning. Indeed, a natural inequity always existed in Paradise for  the purpose of 
organising the created world. 
God's decision to "let us make man, and let him preside...over every creature" 
includes along with the creation of  the rational being the creation of  justice and law 
(232).10 By this double-faceted  directive, God endows man with the office  of  prelacy 
and the law to govern other creatures; they are his properties, and in Fortescue's 
words, they are "innate in him, contemporary with him, and eternal" (235). These 
natural properties then designate the superiority of  man over the created world, 
including woman. It is Eve's disregard for  Adam's natural authority, the inconstancy 
of  her obedience, that justifies  her greater punishment. Before  the Fall, the Brother 
remarks, the Law of  Nature "left  the woman to submit herself  to the man; decreed 
that [she] freely  obey [him]; and taught that the woman should be advised and 
directed by the man." But as she "abused her liberty and made light of  Adam's 
authority by presuming to teach him, Divine law has "diminished her freedom...and 
has appointed him from  henceforth  to be a stricter schoolmaster than he had [been] 
before...Man  [thus]...has been endowed with power, that, if  she rebel, he may be 
able to compel her to obey" (282-3). 
As the Brother explains it, the penalty imposed on Eve for  instructing Adam is 
multifaceted.  At its most basic level, the punishment targets the relation between 
desire and pleasure: "what could have been a more fitting  punishment for  the 
woman," the Brother asks, "who for  her own pleasure incited the man to death, than 
that she should bring forth  with pain the man whom she longs to bring forth  to 
life?"  (282). Eve and her descendants, therefore,  are subjected to a punishment that 
uses desire as both the instrument and object of  punishment. It follows  then that 
Eve's disobedience entails a resignification  of  feminine  desire, or a change in its prop-
erties, an alteration that complicates the meaning of  pleasure. As the Brother reasons, 
"the subjection of  the woman, which had formerly  been to her desirable and joyful, 
was now by that judgment [against Eve] bestrewn with the most bitter circum-
stances" (304).11 Now that desire is disassociated from  the original pleasure of  femi-
nine subjection to masculine authority, it would seem to follow  that women would 
then find  pleasure in acts of  disobedience to that authority. Hence, by taking away 
from  Eve the alleged original pleasure of  subjection, natural and divine law—accord-
ing to the implicit logic of  the Brother's reasoning—produce the very conditions for 
disobedience that they penalise.12 
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Nevertheless the etiology he presents is used to justify  the punishment of 
women, of  feminine  desire, by men. As he observes, 
What can be more irksome than to be robbed of  liberty? or more repugnant 
than to be deprived of  one's own will, and subjected to the will of  another? 
It was also of  necessity a torment to the woman to be compelled to tremble 
under the threats of  another, instead of  enjoying her former 
delights.... [S]ince the man has been appointed the lord of  the woman, he is 
able to threaten her, and therefore  to inflict  punishment on her. All these 
things the said judgment hath worked in the woman's case (304). 
Eve and her descendants, therefore,  bear the weight of  the Fall, and the punishment, 
as formulated  by Fortescue, is delivered through a metaphor of  crime: she is "robbed 
of  liberty." Thus, while the consequences of  the first  sin endow Adam with the power 
to acquire and transfer  property to his sons and they to theirs, they have the opposite 
effect  for  Eve and her descendants. She becomes a figure  of  dispossession, transmit-
ting "the infection  of  her crime" to her heirs. 
Indeed within the Brother's exegesis of  royal succession, a woman marks a break 
in the chain or ladder of  descent, a break that corresponds to a fall: 
...we may describe descent to be progression from  above [from  God] by 
steps of  causation. Wherefore,  if  anything descend not on this ladder step 
by step, but sink headlong to the bottom, its lapse is not a descent, but a fall 
and a downthrow, which things threaten death, and are not the marks of 
life.  For a fall  is a desertion of  the law of  nature, and so tends to corruption, 
and hastens into non-existence; as doth everything which refuses  to be led 
by nature's law....And since every fall  is a defect,  seeing it is a defection  from 
nature's guidance, every fall  is also a vice and a sin, that is, a transgression of 
the order or nature (293). 
A woman, therefore,  has not only succumbed to and participated in the first  Fall, but 
she comes to represent the pervasiveness of  sin in the temporal world. Like a fall,  she 
is a "defect...  vice and sin...a transgression." From this exposition as well, we see that 
man's original authority over woman has been supplemented: "Thus hath the Lord 
hired the man with perpetual  wages, the stipend,  namely, of  power and the honour of 
lordship, that he may prevent the woman from  further  transgressing the precepts of 
nature's law" (282-3). Adam thus "earns" this "bread," die power and honour of 
Ε. Kay Harris 259 
lordship over woman, through Eve's sin and transfers  this authority to his descen-
dants. Through Fortescue's exegesis of  the Fall of  Adam and Eve, he not only "dis-
covers" the origin of  property and the law of  inheritance, but in a sense he 
confiscates  the original property of  woman, the liberty she held before  the Fall, and 
allocates it to man. 
The Law of the King and the Confiscation of Property 
The Brother's explication of  Eve's relationship to Adam both before  and after  the Fall 
demands that a woman be governed by a man; thus, the Daughter has no right to an 
office  that would place her in a position of  authority over men. Since, however, the 
Brother must not only invalidate the Daughter's claim to the throne but the Grand-
son's as well, it is not enough to have natural and divine law privilege men over 
women: distinctions must also be made among men. As we will see, the law of  the 
king, which Fortescue identifies  as an extension of  natural law and the defining  fea-
ture that separates a regal dominion from  a political one, provides the means to do 
this. 
In Part I, Fortescue attempts to trace the history of  kingship back to the first 
king on the earth, but he acknowledges that the task is impossible since the Bible 
passes over this event in silence. He, therefore,  turns to the history of  Israel and to its 
first  king. God had told Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob that their progeny would be 
kings, but the installation of  the first  king of  Israel does not exactly fulfill  this divine 
promise. As Fortescue reports, it was the people of  Israel, not God, who decided that 
it was time to have a king. Wanting to be like other nations, the Israelites approached 
the prophet Samuel with their request. Since Israel's desire was, according to Fortes-
cue, a sin, tantamount to "chang[ing] king God for  king Man," the origin of  kings in 
Israel, like the origin of  property, is precipitated by sin. Endeavouring to square this 
sinful  beginning of  kingship in Israel with the divine promise and with natural law, 
Fortescue reasons that: 
[Although that people committed a great offence  in asking for  a king, this 
proveth not that the kingly dignity which they demanded is an unjust thing, 
nor doth it condemn the law under which that dignity came into being. 
What is there more sacred than the Pontifical  office,  although it is sought 
by wicked men? Now, the Lord in this proceeding...approved and com-
mended the kingly power in divers ways. For he appointed them a king 
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chosen by Himself  alone, and not by them, and anointed him with the holy 
oil and made him His Anointed...which He never did for  any king before. 
Moreover, He filled  that king with the spirit of  strength and prophecy, and 
changed him into another man (204). 
This passage serves at least two important functions,  rescuing, as it does, the office  of 
king from  any misuse to which a particular king may put it and making it clear that 
the office  itself  exempts even bad kings from  any punishment that their subjects may 
wish to impose on them. The deaths of  such men are to be prayed for,  observes 
Fortescue, but it is "not lawful  for  any one to do this thing, least of  all their subjects, 
to whom many times, as required by their own deserts, the Lord appointed wicked 
kings....let the people fear  to kill their Icing, although a tyrant...the kingdom is his" 
(197). By anointing Saul, God changed him, altered, augmented his properties, not 
only giving him the spirit of  strength and prophecy but the kingdom as well. 
Like the Brother's interpretation of  the Fall, this account of  kingship involves sin 
and punishment, and the punishment comes in the form  of  the law of  the king. For 
Fortescue, Samuel's warning to the people that a king will "take your fields  and your 
vineyards and olivevards, and will give them to his servants" constitutes this law 
(202). Property is, obviously, once again the focus  of  law and punishment. The law 
of  the king represents "nothing but the king's power, which a prince governing roy-
all}' can exert over his people; but when that law is referred  to the people, to them it 
is always law, though sometimes good and sometimes bad" (216). The law of  the 
king, like the law of  nature, is a supplement to divine law, a remedy for  yet another 
instance of  the stubborn willfulness  and the disobedience of  human beings. 
Fortescue, however, acknowledges that the power of  the king to take the prop-
erty of  his subjects seems to contradict the basic tenet of  natural law, that is, "to do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you: for  this is the law and the proph-
ets" (Matthew 7:12). He asks, 
What king ever wishes or could wish this to be done to him, that the best 
things for  which he had laboured should be taken from  him and given to 
one who had laboured not? And if  he cannot be suspected of  wishing this 
to be done to himself,  and yet can lawfully  do this to another, then doth the 
law which the Prophet pronounces judge that to be lawful  to him (the 
king), which the law of  nature forbids  to be done (202). 
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Fortescue attempts to resolve this "war" between the law of  nature and the law of  the 
king by arguing that justice requires that each person receive a proper award: "What 
judge awards good things to him who deserves evil, seeing that even' just arbiter rec-
ompenses good to the good, evil to the evil?" (208). Indeed the law of  the king con-
forms  to this sense of  justice, since the people of  Israel did an evil thing by asking for 
a king: they abandoned God who had chosen them "from  among all peoples to be 
His peculiar kingdom, and most tenderly brought up by Him, as an only son by his 
father,  and ruled by laws which He, in His great kindness, gave for  their singular rule 
and favour"  (207). 
Not every king, however, possesses the power to use the law of  the king. Fortes-
cue reserves the use of  that law for  those kings who rule royally, not politically. As is 
well known, he describes the English monarchy as a mixed form  of  rule: the king 
rules both regally, or royally, and politically. Indeed, in this treatise, which is ostensi-
bly about the problem of  royal succession in the kingdom of  Assyria, references  to 
the laws and government of  England are frequent.  Hence, with regard to the regal 
portion of  the English monarch}7, Fortescue defines  a royal government as one whose 
laws are authorised by the king, and the kingdom is subject to the king's dignity, that 
is, possessed "by kings and their heirs in hereditary right, in such manner as no 
dominions are possessed which are only politickly ruled" (206). 
Although "[r]oyal Law did not take its rise in Paradise....like the law of  nature" 
(221), it nevertheless burst forth  "when man's nature had been polluted by sin, and 
the purity of  original innocence lost under pagan kings in the earth....[such] that 
[royal] law was allotted out of  a certain Divine severity to the king of  Israel for  the 
ruling of  an inconstant people, stiff-necked  and unthankful,  who, by desiring a king, 
had provoked God to wrath" (221). Though Fortescue separates temporally the ori-
gin of  the law of  the king from  the origin of  property, his description of  the moment 
when the law of  the king first  appears repeats the original Fall since "the purity of 
original innocence [was] lost under pagan kings," though the loss of  original inno-
cence by Adam and Eve would seem to preclude the possibility of  losing it once 
again. In effect,  Fortescue almost conflates  the two falls—he  diminishes the distance 
that separates the two to a single important difference:  the creation and restriction of 
a supreme masculine authority and identity to one man. The natural inequity that 
existed in Paradise and was subsequendy exacerbated through Eve's insubordination 
to Adam is exacerbated once again through the constitution of  regal dignity and the 
law of  the king as the power to confiscate  the property of  subjects. Male subjects are 
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thus threatened by a punishment that feminises  them, and Fortescue thus prepares 
the way to dispossess the Grandson of  the King. 
This procedure relies on non-static conceptions of  feminine  and masculine iden-
tities and of  private and public realms. One of  the first  extensions of  the domestic or 
private realm into the public follows  a statement made by the Daughter in which she 
argues that only married women are subject to the authority of  men. Interpreting his 
mother's argument as though it had created an opposition between women and the 
"sacrament of  matrimony" rather than between married and single women, the 
Grandson rejoins: 
...in that the first  woman had the presumption to guide her husband, she 
transgressed the rank assigned to her condition in the order of  the universe, 
and thereby merited the punishment decreed by the said judgment. How 
then could wedlock have been the sinner....It was not wedlock that sinned, 
but the female  sex was the offender;  and, therefore,  one penalty has now 
deservedly involved married and single women alike. For the sin of  the 
woman broke out of  the vicious disposition of  the guilty sex, and not out of 
the sacrament of  matrimony... Nor is a woman when free  from  the bonds of 
wedlock released from  the power of  man; ...she will not escape from  obedi-
ence to him who bears supreme rule over the country in which she dwells. 
And, therefore,  it is not permitted to think that only married women are 
subject to men (304-5). 
Here the Grandson reasons that a woman holds the position of  a wife  whether or not 
she is married on the premise that the relation between a woman and the supreme 
ruler of  her country replicates her relationship with her husband: the domestic rela-
tionship has been politicised. 
As the boundaries between domestic and political unobtrusively break down, 
the distinctions between masculine and feminine  identities also become less categori-
cal, a necessary tactic if  Fortescue is to reconcile the Brother's account of  the origin of 
property with the law of  the king. The two narratives indeed pose a tactical problem. 
Property according to the Brother accrues to men through their labour and becomes 
infused  with the blood and is by that means transferred  from  father  to son. On the 
other hand, the royal dignity expressed through the law of  the king allows a king to 
confiscate  the property of  his subjects. How does one go about alienating or 
abstracting an innate property from  the blood ? 
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Although Fortescue does not pose this question directly, he addresses it indi-
rectly Interrupting the Brother to speak in his own voice, Fortescue refers  to an 
English legal practice that explains how both internal and external properties of  sub-
jects are controlled by the law: 
[I]η the Kingdom of  England there is a law of  such a kind that, if  any one 
shall have been convicted, or, to use the words of  that law, attainted,  of  fel-
ony or treason, his blood is forthwith  adjudged by that law to be so cor-
rupted that, although by the prince's favour  he escape death, he 
nevertheless will not be capable henceforth  of  succeeding his parents in 
their inheritances, nor will any of  his posterity succeed him in his inherit-
ance. Wherefore,  if  from  that time in the lifetime  of  such an attainted per-
son, or after  his death, his father  shall have died possessed of  a property, 
however great, the son of  the man so attainted will not, by the law of  the 
land, be capable of  succeeding his grandfather  in his patrimony;... [A]s the 
inheritance of  such a grandfather  cannot descend to his son who has been 
so convicted, so neither can it descend to his grandson by the son so con-
victed, inasmuch as there is an intermediate step between the grandfather 
and the grandson, namely that attainted son...because anything which 
descends cannot leap over or pass by any step (298-9). 
The English practice of  attainder derives from  Roman law, as Floyd Seyward Lear's 
account of  the Roman concept of  attainder reveals: 
Section One [of  Codex  Justinianus  9.8.5 Ad  Legem lidiam  Maiestatis]  adds 
the concept of  attainder or corruption of  blood since the sons of  such an 
offender  will be spared their lives although they merit the fate  of  their 
father  because the inclination to commit his crime is inherited. The infamy 
of  their father  will accompany them always. They will always be debarred 
from  holding public office  or performing  public duties. Their lot in life  will 
be perpetual want; death will be a solace and life  a punishment.13 
Through the process of  attainder, then, the reverse of  the acquisition of  property is 
put into play, that is, crime dissolves a person's possessions, both internal and exter-
nal. In effect,  the attainted is relegated to the position of  a woman who, according to 
the Brother's argument, cannot annex, internalise, or inherit immovable property. 
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Fortescue then connects the consequences of  attainder to the question of  succes-
sion: 
Wherefore,  if  the case which we are discussing shall have arisen in that king-
dom, we cannot doubt that the kingdom in question cannot descend to the 
grandson, seeing that his mother, through whom as a medium he would 
obtain it, cannot by any right possess it....Wherefore...the  grandson....since 
his mother by judgment of  the law of  nature is incapacitated for  her father's 
kingdom, and so he cannot succeed his mother therein, cannot à fortiori 
succeed his grandfather  through the medium of  his mother (298-9). 
With this further  explanation of  attainder, Fortescue goes beyond Justinian. Rather 
than inheriting an incapacity from  a father  who has been condemned as a traitor, the 
Grandson has acquired it from  his mother. While the attainder for  felon}'  and treason 
is imposed 011 him by English law, the Daughter is by the law of  nature always 
already attainted: she is by Eve's unnatural act of  disobedience represented as a natu-
ral criminal, as naturally corrupt. 
Inheriting her tainted blood, the Grandson shares that criminal state. The 
"vicious disposition of  the guilty sex" he had attributed to his Mother now becomes 
his as well. Therefore,  the Brother of  the King urges the Judge to "put [the Grand-
son] to silence by thy sentence" (300). He is to share his mother's fate;  and she, as 
the Brother directs, is to be prohibited "from  any more demanding her father's  king-
dom, since...its entrance [is] shut against her with so man}' bolts and bars, that 
henceforth  all ingress is for  her impossible" (284). Although not guilty of  having 
committed any crime, both the Daughter and the Grandson are attainted, the 
Daughter naturally and the Grandson legally In this case, however, "legally" operates 
as an empty term, since no crime has been committed. Using the English law of 
attainder, Fortescue in effect  turns the Grandson, and with him the Yorkist Edward 
IV, into a woman, thereby justifying  the exclusion of  both men from  the political 
realm. 
Such a transformation  in gender relies on an interpretation that feminine  desire 
is not only the origin of  the sin of  disobedience but of  the crime of  rebellion as well. 
One of  the earliest associations of  women with rebellion occurs immediately after  the 
Brother has explained how Eve and all women have been made to suffer  as a conse-
quence of  Eve's original act of  disobedience. He asks, "And what is better fitted  to 
restrain the arrogance of  a rebellious  subject than to subject the rebel with a firmer 
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bond to the authority which he hath despised?" (282, emphasis added). The question 
actually produces two pertinent resignifications:  Eve's sin against Adam now encom-
passes a political act, the crime of  rebellion, and the use of  the masculine pronominal 
he where we would expect to see the feminine  she signals a move from  the punish-
ment of  a woman to the punishment of  a man. Two contradictor}7 but politically 
expedient transformations  are performed:  the disobedience of  Eve moves into the 
public arena as rebellion, but this move is countered by excluding the rebellious male 
offender  from  the public realm. The man who engages in rebellion is in effect 
assigned a feminine  identity, and now without any property, he does not properly 
belong within the public or political domain.14 
Turning men into women by an act of  law indicates, as I have mentioned, that 
the féminisation,  the dispossession, and the corruption of  men is not natural to men 
as corruption is natural in the case of  women. Such a legal procedure as attainder reg-
isters the fact  that the rebellious male subject was at least once a man. The differenti-
ation process that exiles attainted traitors and felons  from  the political domain, 
therefore,  is secondary to the exclusionary practices that produce gendered identities 
on the basis of  perceived natural sex/gender differences  between men and women.15 
As Gayle Rubin has observed, "[m]en are of  course also trafficked—but  as slaves, 
hustlers, athletic stars, serfs,  or as some other catastrophic social status, rather than as 
men. Women are transacted as slaves, serfs,  and prostitutes, but also simply as 
women."16 Being an attainted traitor amounts to a "catastrophic social status." In an 
essay that traces the history of  representations of  women, Elizabeth V Spelman calls 
attention to the importance of  seeing to "what extent the images and arguments used 
to denigrate women are similar to those used to denigrate one group of  men vis-à-vis 
another, children vis-à-vis adults, animals vis-à-vis humans, and even...the natural 
world vis-à-vis man's will....For to see this is part of  understanding how the oppres-
sion of  women occurs in the context of,  and is related to, other forms  of  oppression 
or exploitation."17 Not only authorising the confiscation  of  external properties of 
traitors, acts of  attainder thus altered gendered identities by declaring the attainted to 
be disabled at law, bereft  of  all civil privileges, and their blood to be corrupt.18 Diag-
nosing bodies to be corrupt, bills of  attainder provided the justification  to restrict the 
movements of  traitors within society, to quarantine them, and distinguish them from 
the general population.19 
In England, attainder had long been a punishment for  treason before  the fif-
teenth century, but the procedure had tended to be an informal  one. The proscription 
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of  the Duke of  York and his supporters in 1459, however, generated a standard for 
future  acts. Enacted by Parliament, but under the close supervision of  the king, 
attainder in the latter half  of  the fifteenth  century was not the consequence of  a trial 
in which an accused had been found  guilty of  treason. In point of  fact,  fifteenth-cen-
tury attainder operated only in the absence of  judicial process20 and can be seen as a 
legislative form  of  summary judgment, and as a manifestation  of  the law of  the 
king.21 
The attainders of  Jack Cade, the Duke of  York, and the Earl of  Northumberland 
during the reign of  the Lancastrian Henry VI provided not only for  the confiscation 
of  their lands, but also for  their disablement at law and the corruption of  their blood. 
In the case of  Cade, parliamentary rolls record that in addition to the forfeiture  of 
goods, lands, and income, his blood was declared corrupt; hence, through his blood 
Iiis heirs were "disabled for  ever.1,22 Likewise, attainders of  York and his allies 
required that they be "disabled for  ever to have or enjoye any enheritaunce in any 
wise hereafter...an  in lyke wise their heires."23 A record of  a petition made by Henry 
Percy to reverse the attainder of  his father,  the Earl of  Northumberland, describes the 
severity of  such a penalty by reciting its consequences. 
Howbeit that by force  of  an Acte made ayenst his Fader...the same late Erie, 
among other persons, was unabled to have, hold, enherite or joie, any name 
of  dignities, estate or preeminence, within this Reaume...and the heires of 
the same late Erie, were unable to clayme or have by the same late Erie, any 
suche name estate or preeminence.24 
With their blood declared corrupt and their civil rights denied, attainted traitors were 
a new creation whose exclusion from  the public realm and the possibility of  restora-
tion depended on the king's prerogative. 
Acts of  attainder thus illustrate the capacity of  the law to enter into the interior 
spaces of  the body for  the purpose of  condemning and regendering it. As we have 
seen, divine, and natural law define  the disease of  crime, especially that of  rebellion 
and treason, as the (un)natural disease of  women. As a consequence of  crime, the law 
transfers  the natural disposition of  the guilty sex to men, a move that not only 
dispossesses male subjects of  their land, but of  their "innate" masculinity as well. In 
the Brother's exegesis of  the origin of  property and its ramifications,  it is the identity 
of  the King alone that fused  with the property of  the kingdom remains thoroughly 
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masculine, thoroughly autonomous, thoroughly royal, profiting  in every case as did 
Adam from  both the obedience and disobedience of  his subjects. 
Fortescue and the Law 
The power which Fortescue allocates to a regal monarch or to a regal and political 
one, such as the English monarch, is secure only within his text. The Wars of  the 
Roses blatantly attest to its fiction.  With the throne of  England oscillating between 
the Lancastrian Henry VI and the Yorkist Edward IV from  1460-1471, neither line 
was thoroughly and unchangingly royal and masculine enough to exempt itself  from 
the attainders that were legislated against it once the rival dynasty had gained ascen-
dancy. In a sense, then, Fortescue through his writing creates and sustains the regal 
properties of  the king, interposing himself  between the law and the king; in other 
words, he is the liaison between the ordained properties of  the king and the person of 
the king. 
As mentioned earlier, the proscription of  the Yorkists in 1459 set the standard 
for  future  acts of  attainder. It is highly unlikely that Fortescue did not have a part in 
writing the bills that declared the Duke of  York and his heirs to be traitors and their 
blood corrupt. If  the preamble to York's attainder is compared to Fortescue's descrip-
tion of  the ingratitude of  the people of  Israel for  abandoning ""king God for  king 
Man," similarities emerge. The confiscation  of  York's land and the corruption of  his 
blood is justified  by the Duke's ingratitude: 
Please it your Higness to calle to youre noble remembrance, howe Ye had 
Richard Due of  York in his vong age, in your most high presence and noble 
Court, and hym all that tyme cherisshed and favoured;  and afterward  at 
gretter age, for  the love, trust and affiance  that Ye had in his persone, made 
hym youre Lieutenant of  youre Realme of  Fraunce and Duchie of  Nor-
mandie, and created his 11 eldest sonnes Erles, and graunted hym Offices 
and grete benefettes....So  that it could not be thought a subjet...[would] 
have had more cause to have been true, obeisaunt, and diligent to serve and 
love his Soveraigne Lord then he had.25 
According to this record, the Duke of  York and his sons, like the Israelites in their 
relationship with God, owed everything to Henry VI, and they, too, failed  to 
acknowledge this debt.26 Thus Henry, like Adam and Saul, profits,  however briefly, 
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from  the disobedience of  his subjects, and so do the royal jurists who in composing 
this bill fulfill  Samuel's role. As Ralph A. Griffiths  has observed, the royal jurists 
undertook this task "with an eye on the rewards which might come their way for  a 
job well done."27 And they were rewarded for  their labour; Henry redistributed his 
newly acquired property to his loyal supporters. For example, shortly after  the attain-
ders had been passed, Fortescue was entrusted with some of  the confiscated  lands.28 
It must be remembered, however, that Fortescue writes De Natura  from  what 
seems to be a weak or "catastrophic" position. For he along with Henry VI was 
attainted as a traitor by a Yorkist parliament soon after  Edward IV became king. But 
De Natura  works for  Fortescue in two important ways. First, by proclaiming a line of 
descent that includes a woman to be unnatural and false,  Fortescue invalidates the 
new identity that Edward IV and his parliament have imposed on him. In fact,  it is 
the descendants of  a woman who are naturally prone to deviate from  natural law and 
instigate rebellion: Edward and the Yorkists are the traitors. Although De Natura 
does not refer  explicitly to the wars fought  by the Yorkists and Lancastrians, the topic 
of  civil war both introduces and ends the treatise. After  the Judge has ruled in the 
Brother's favor,  Fortescue remits his text to examination of  the "Supreme Pontiff," 
and explains, 
If  in the preceding Treatise we have arrived at firm  and impregnable conclu-
sions, we have extinguished that fuel  of  malice which has kindled up to this 
time such unceasing wars among kings. I mean that inveterate error by 
which women, and their heirs through them, have been thought able to 
succeed to the throne in sovereign kingdoms (331). 
According to this logic, Philippa, the granddaughter of  Edward III and the conduit 
by which the Yorkist dynasty traces its line of  descent back to Edward III, has passed 
on through her blood the "inveterate error" of  presumption which now escalates into 
usurpation and civil war. In effect,  the claim of  the Grandson or the claim of  the 
Yorkists to the right to rule represents another fall,  in that they seek to acquire prop-
erty that does not belong to them and to alter the natural hierarchy of  king and sub-
ject. Thus their pretensions require a punishment comparable in severity to that 
which God imposed on Eve. Edward and his supporters are to be treated as women. 
De Natura  also goes far  to enhance Fortescue's position as an authority on law 
and the governance of  the kingdom, and it completes the task he has set for  himself 
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at the beginning of  the treatise. Emphasising in the beginning of  the treatise the need 
to explain the law of  royal succession, Fortescue proclaims: 
Oh, then, what a pious and holy thing it would be to reveal the truth which 
here is sought, stripped of  ever}' veil of  error, naked and shining! Seeing 
that under the cloud of  this ignorance so many hard-fought  wars, so many 
civil contests, pervading the whole world, have prevailed, not only in the 
most noble kingdoms of  France and England, but in ver}' many other 
regions also, where the bloody sword, accompanied only by the justice of 
this truth, has devoured thousands upon thousands of  men. This truth, 
therefore,  if  it can be made plain by a definition  beyond doubt, will, by the 
guidance of  God, appease wars not a few  already begun, and will withdraw 
material for  the beginning of  the like hereafter  (191). 
By uncovering and declaring this truth, "a pious and holy" act, Fortescue is the vessel 
by which rebellion in any kingdom will be destroyed. Moreover, he makes the case 
that jurists who for  their years of  study in all laws, including divine law, are especially 
equipped to uncover the relation between divine, natural, and human law (241-2). 
The "higher mysteries of  the law," as he explains, "remain for  those who are learned 
in the law" (247).29 
The Lancastrians, however, were ultimately defeated  in 1471, and Fortescue's 
treatise did not have one of  its desired effects:  that of  restoring Henry to the throne. 
His treatise, nevertheless, stood him in good stead. For although Fortescue was one 
of  the lawyers that the Yorkists were "intent on bringing...to book" for  drafting  the 
bills of  attainder against them,30 he was not put to death when he was captured. The 
fact  that he was not attests in part to his successful  representation of  himself  as an 
authority on all aspects of  law. Fortescue's attainder was reversed, and he once again 
enjoyed a privileged position within a royalist circle, Yorkist not Lancastrian. As a 
condition for  the reversal of  the attainder, Edward IV stipulated that Fortescue 
retract those writings he had composed in Scotland. And the way in which Fortescue 
retracts the argument of  De N  attira  manifests  once again his tacit and skillfull  alloca-
tion of  feminine  characteristics to a man. In this case, it is he who occupies the femi-
nine role by acknowledging to the king that his exegesis on natural law and royal 
succession is inadequate—not an objective exposition but an "informal  tale" based 
on his partiality for  Henry VI (534). Through this dutiful  submission to Edward IV, 
Fortescue regains both his masculinity and his property.31 
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Fortescue's capacity to prove himself  eminently invaluable to two rival kings 
challenges the idea held by a number of  legal scholars that he was an early constitu-
tionalist. In his preface  to Fortescue's De Laiidibus  Legum Anglie,  for  example, 
Harold Dexter Hazeltine remarks that this fifteenth-century  Chief  Justice "was in 
revolt against authority."32 Nevertheless, Hazeltine remarks near the end of  his pref-
ace that Fortescue's "books anticipate some of  the reformative  measures which in fact 
led to the establishment of  the Tudor kingship in the sixteenth century as the stron-
gest English monarchy since the time of  the Normans and the Angevins."33 Indeed, 
based on his ability to shape and allocate feminine  and masculine properties— 
whether his own or a king's or a traitor's—Fortescue did not revolt against authority. 
Rather, in a godlike performance,  he created authority; and he created it both mascu-
line and royal. 
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